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openat2.h
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ #ifndef _LINUX_OPENAT2_H #define _LINUX_OPENAT2_H #include <linux/types.h> /* * Arguments for how openat2(2) should open the target path. If only @flags and * @mode are non-zero, then openat2(2) operates very similarly to openat(2). * * However, unlike openat(2), unknown or invalid bits in @flags result in * -EINVAL rather than being silently ignored. @mode must be zero unless one of * {O_CREAT, O_TMPFILE} are set. * * @flags: O_* flags. * @mode: O_CREAT/O_TMPFILE file mode. * @resolve: RESOLVE_* flags. */ struct open_how { __u64 flags; __u64 mode; __u64 resolve; }; /* how->resolve flags for openat2(2). */ #define RESOLVE_NO_XDEV 0x01 /* Block mount-point crossings (includes bind-mounts). */ #define RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x02 /* Block traversal through procfs-style "magic-links". */ #define RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS 0x04 /* Block traversal through all symlinks (implies OEXT_NO_MAGICLINKS) */ #define RESOLVE_BENEATH 0x08 /* Block "lexical" trickery like "..", symlinks, and absolute paths which escape the dirfd. */ #define RESOLVE_IN_ROOT 0x10 /* Make all jumps to "/" and ".." be scoped inside the dirfd (similar to chroot(2)). */ #endif /* _LINUX_OPENAT2_H */
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