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RAND_DRBG.7
.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 4.11 (Pod::Simple 3.35) .\" .\" Standard preamble: .\" ======================================================================== .de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) .if t .sp .5v .if n .sp .. .de Vb \" Begin verbatim text .ft CW .nf .ne \\$1 .. .de Ve \" End verbatim text .ft R .fi .. .\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will .\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left .\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will .\" give a nicer C++. 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Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l .nh .SH "NAME" RAND_DRBG \- the deterministic random bit generator .SH "SYNOPSIS" .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 1 \& #include <openssl/rand_drbg.h> .Ve .SH "DESCRIPTION" .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" The default OpenSSL \s-1RAND\s0 method is based on the \s-1RAND_DRBG\s0 class, which implements a deterministic random bit generator (\s-1DRBG\s0). A \s-1DRBG\s0 is a certain type of cryptographically-secure pseudo-random number generator (\s-1CSPRNG\s0), which is described in [\s-1NIST SP 800\-90A\s0 Rev. 1]. .PP While the \s-1RAND API\s0 is the 'frontend' which is intended to be used by application developers for obtaining random bytes, the \s-1RAND_DRBG API\s0 serves as the 'backend', connecting the former with the operating systems's entropy sources and providing access to the \s-1DRBG\s0's configuration parameters. .SS "Disclaimer" .IX Subsection "Disclaimer" Unless you have very specific requirements for your random generator, it is in general not necessary to utilize the \s-1RAND_DRBG API\s0 directly. The usual way to obtain random bytes is to use \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3) or \&\fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3), see also \s-1\fBRAND\s0\fR\|(7). .SS "Typical Use Cases" .IX Subsection "Typical Use Cases" Typical examples for such special use cases are the following: .IP "\(bu" 2 You want to use your own private \s-1DRBG\s0 instances. Multiple \s-1DRBG\s0 instances which are accessed only by a single thread provide additional security (because their internal states are independent) and better scalability in multithreaded applications (because they don't need to be locked). .IP "\(bu" 2 You need to integrate a previously unsupported entropy source. .IP "\(bu" 2 You need to change the default settings of the standard OpenSSL \s-1RAND\s0 implementation to meet specific requirements. .SH "CHAINING" .IX Header "CHAINING" A \s-1DRBG\s0 instance can be used as the entropy source of another \s-1DRBG\s0 instance, provided it has itself access to a valid entropy source. The \s-1DRBG\s0 instance which acts as entropy source is called the \fIparent\fR \s-1DRBG,\s0 the other instance the \fIchild\fR \s-1DRBG.\s0 .PP This is called chaining. A chained \s-1DRBG\s0 instance is created by passing a pointer to the parent \s-1DRBG\s0 as argument to the \fBRAND_DRBG_new()\fR call. It is possible to create chains of more than two \s-1DRBG\s0 in a row. .SH "THE THREE SHARED DRBG INSTANCES" .IX Header "THE THREE SHARED DRBG INSTANCES" Currently, there are three shared \s-1DRBG\s0 instances, the <master>, <public>, and <private> \s-1DRBG.\s0 While the <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 is a single global instance, the <public> and <private> \&\s-1DRBG\s0 are created per thread and accessed through thread-local storage. .PP By default, the functions \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3) and \fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3) use the thread-local <public> and <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance, respectively. .SS "The <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance" .IX Subsection "The <master> DRBG instance" The <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 is not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other two \s-1DRBG\s0 instances. It reseeds itself by obtaining randomness either from os entropy sources or by consuming randomness which was added previously by \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3). .SS "The <public> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance" .IX Subsection "The <public> DRBG instance" This instance is used per default by \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3). .SS "The <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance" .IX Subsection "The <private> DRBG instance" This instance is used per default by \fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3) .SH "LOCKING" .IX Header "LOCKING" The <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 is intended to be accessed concurrently for reseeding by its child \s-1DRBG\s0 instances. The necessary locking is done internally. It is \fInot\fR thread-safe to access the <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 directly via the \&\s-1RAND_DRBG\s0 interface. The <public> and <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 are thread-local, i.e. there is an instance of each per thread. So they can safely be accessed without locking via the \s-1RAND_DRBG\s0 interface. .PP Pointers to these \s-1DRBG\s0 instances can be obtained using \&\fBRAND_DRBG_get0_master()\fR, \&\fBRAND_DRBG_get0_public()\fR, and \&\fBRAND_DRBG_get0_private()\fR, respectively. Note that it is not allowed to store a pointer to one of the thread-local \&\s-1DRBG\s0 instances in a variable or other memory location where it will be accessed and used by multiple threads. .PP All other \s-1DRBG\s0 instances created by an application don't support locking, because they are intended to be used by a single thread. Instead of accessing a single \s-1DRBG\s0 instance concurrently from different threads, it is recommended to instantiate a separate \s-1DRBG\s0 instance per thread. Using the <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 as entropy source for multiple \s-1DRBG\s0 instances on different threads is thread-safe, because the \s-1DRBG\s0 instance will lock the <master> \s-1DRBG\s0 automatically for obtaining random input. .SH "THE OVERALL PICTURE" .IX Header "THE OVERALL PICTURE" The following picture gives an overview over how the \s-1DRBG\s0 instances work together and are being used. .PP .Vb 10 \& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& | os entropy sources | \& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& | \& v +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& RAND_add() ==> <master> <\-| shared DRBG (with locking) | \& / \e +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& / \e +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& <public> <private> <\- | per\-thread DRBG instances | \& | | +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& v v \& RAND_bytes() RAND_priv_bytes() \& | ^ \& | | \& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ \& | general purpose | | used for secrets like session keys | \& | random generator | | and private keys for certificates | \& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ .Ve .PP The usual way to obtain random bytes is to call RAND_bytes(...) or RAND_priv_bytes(...). These calls are roughly equivalent to calling RAND_DRBG_bytes(<public>, ...) and RAND_DRBG_bytes(<private>, ...), respectively. The method \fBRAND_DRBG_bytes\fR\|(3) is a convenience method wrapping the \fBRAND_DRBG_generate\fR\|(3) function, which serves the actual request for random data. .SH "RESEEDING" .IX Header "RESEEDING" A \s-1DRBG\s0 instance seeds itself automatically, pulling random input from its entropy source. The entropy source can be either a trusted operating system entropy source, or another \s-1DRBG\s0 with access to such a source. .PP Automatic reseeding occurs after a predefined number of generate requests. The selection of the trusted entropy sources is configured at build time using the \-\-with\-rand\-seed option. The following sections explain the reseeding process in more detail. .SS "Automatic Reseeding" .IX Subsection "Automatic Reseeding" Before satisfying a generate request (\fBRAND_DRBG_generate\fR\|(3)), the \s-1DRBG\s0 reseeds itself automatically, if one of the following conditions holds: .PP \&\- the \s-1DRBG\s0 was not instantiated (=seeded) yet or has been uninstantiated. .PP \&\- the number of generate requests since the last reseeding exceeds a certain threshold, the so called \fIreseed_interval\fR. This behaviour can be disabled by setting the \fIreseed_interval\fR to 0. .PP \&\- the time elapsed since the last reseeding exceeds a certain time interval, the so called \fIreseed_time_interval\fR. This can be disabled by setting the \fIreseed_time_interval\fR to 0. .PP \&\- the \s-1DRBG\s0 is in an error state. .PP \&\fBNote\fR: An error state is entered if the entropy source fails while the \s-1DRBG\s0 is seeding or reseeding. The last case ensures that the \s-1DRBG\s0 automatically recovers from the error as soon as the entropy source is available again. .SS "Manual Reseeding" .IX Subsection "Manual Reseeding" In addition to automatic reseeding, the caller can request an immediate reseeding of the \s-1DRBG\s0 with fresh entropy by setting the \&\fIprediction resistance\fR parameter to 1 when calling \fBRAND_DRBG_generate\fR\|(3). .PP The document [\s-1NIST SP 800\-90C\s0] describes prediction resistance requests in detail and imposes strict conditions on the entropy sources that are approved for providing prediction resistance. Since the default \s-1DRBG\s0 implementation does not have access to such an approved entropy source, a request for prediction resistance will currently always fail. In other words, prediction resistance is currently not supported yet by the \s-1DRBG.\s0 .PP For the three shared DRBGs (and only for these) there is another way to reseed them manually: If \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3) is called with a positive \fIrandomness\fR argument (or \fBRAND_seed\fR\|(3)), then this will immediately reseed the <master> \s-1DRBG.\s0 The <public> and <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 will detect this on their next generate call and reseed, pulling randomness from <master>. .PP The last feature has been added to support the common practice used with previous OpenSSL versions to call \fBRAND_add()\fR before calling \fBRAND_bytes()\fR. .SS "Entropy Input vs. Additional Data" .IX Subsection "Entropy Input vs. Additional Data" The \s-1DRBG\s0 distinguishes two different types of random input: \fIentropy\fR, which comes from a trusted source, and \fIadditional input\fR', which can optionally be added by the user and is considered untrusted. It is possible to add \fIadditional input\fR not only during reseeding, but also for every generate request. This is in fact done automatically by \fBRAND_DRBG_bytes\fR\|(3). .SS "Configuring the Random Seed Source" .IX Subsection "Configuring the Random Seed Source" In most cases OpenSSL will automatically choose a suitable seed source for automatically seeding and reseeding its <master> \s-1DRBG.\s0 In some cases however, it will be necessary to explicitly specify a seed source during configuration, using the \-\-with\-rand\-seed option. For more information, see the \s-1INSTALL\s0 instructions. There are also operating systems where no seed source is available and automatic reseeding is disabled by default. .PP The following two sections describe the reseeding process of the master \&\s-1DRBG,\s0 depending on whether automatic reseeding is available or not. .SS "Reseeding the master \s-1DRBG\s0 with automatic seeding enabled" .IX Subsection "Reseeding the master DRBG with automatic seeding enabled" Calling \fBRAND_poll()\fR or \fBRAND_add()\fR is not necessary, because the \s-1DRBG\s0 pulls the necessary entropy from its source automatically. However, both calls are permitted, and do reseed the \s-1RNG.\s0 .PP \&\fBRAND_add()\fR can be used to add both kinds of random input, depending on the value of the \fBrandomness\fR argument: .IP "randomness == 0:" 4 .IX Item "randomness == 0:" The random bytes are mixed as additional input into the current state of the \s-1DRBG.\s0 Mixing in additional input is not considered a full reseeding, hence the reseed counter is not reset. .IP "randomness > 0:" 4 .IX Item "randomness > 0:" The random bytes are used as entropy input for a full reseeding (resp. reinstantiation) if the \s-1DRBG\s0 is instantiated (resp. uninstantiated or in an error state). The number of random bits required for reseeding is determined by the security strength of the \s-1DRBG.\s0 Currently it defaults to 256 bits (32 bytes). It is possible to provide less randomness than required. In this case the missing randomness will be obtained by pulling random input from the trusted entropy sources. .SS "Reseeding the master \s-1DRBG\s0 with automatic seeding disabled" .IX Subsection "Reseeding the master DRBG with automatic seeding disabled" Calling \fBRAND_poll()\fR will always fail. .PP \&\fBRAND_add()\fR needs to be called for initial seeding and periodic reseeding. At least 48 bytes (384 bits) of randomness have to be provided, otherwise the (re\-)seeding of the \s-1DRBG\s0 will fail. This corresponds to one and a half times the security strength of the \s-1DRBG.\s0 The extra half is used for the nonce during instantiation. .PP More precisely, the number of bytes needed for seeding depend on the \&\fIsecurity strength\fR of the \s-1DRBG,\s0 which is set to 256 by default. .SH "SEE ALSO" .IX Header "SEE ALSO" \&\fBRAND_DRBG_bytes\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_generate\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_reseed\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_get0_master\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_get0_public\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_get0_private\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval\fR\|(3), \&\fBRAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults\fR\|(3), \&\s-1\fBRAND\s0\fR\|(7), .SH "COPYRIGHT" .IX Header "COPYRIGHT" Copyright 2017\-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. .PP Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
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